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Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter
The Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City, California, began its effort to build a Sikh temple (gurudwara) in April 2001, when it applied for a conditional use permit for a 1.89 acre property it owned on Grove Road in Yuba City. The site was located in a residential zone designated primarily for large lot single family homes, where the zoning ordinance permits churches and other religious institutions only with a conditional use permit.County staff found that the project would be consistent with the county's general plan and recommended approval of the application with conditions that would minimize potential conflicts with established residences in the area. But on April 4, 2001 the County Planning Commission voted unanimously to deny the CUP application, responding to complaints from neighbors regarding "noise and traffic."
Rather than appeal the decision, the Guru Nanak Sikh Society began searching for a different property. In 2002 they bought a 28 acre parcel in an unincorporated area of the county zoned AG-20 (agricultural land, 20 acre minimum lot size). On January 9, 2002 the Society applied for a conditional use permit seeking approval for expansion and use of an existing house as a Sikh temple. As with the previous application, the Society stipulated that no more than 75 people would occupy the facility at any one time.
Once again, the county staff found the proposed use consistent with the county's general plan and recommended approval of the application (with some mitigation measures to alleviate environmental concerns). "Staff believes that . . . the proposed temple will not conflict with existing adjacent agricultural uses . . the proposal will not be detrimental to the health, safety, and general welfare of persons residing or working in the neighborhood." Once again, neighbors complained, citing traffic and property value concerns. But this time, the Planning Commission approved the CUP on a vote of 4-3.
The complaining neighbors now appealed the Planning Commission decision to the County Board of Supervisors. County staff recommended that the Board deny the appeal and uphold the Planning Commission's approval of a CUP. But following a public hearing on May 21, 2002, the Board voted unanimously to deny the use permit.
On August 19, 2002 the Guru Nanak Sikh Society filed suit against the county and members of the County Board in U.S. District Court, alleging more than 20 violations of state and federal law, including RLUIPA. Senior Judge Lawrence Karlton was assigned to the case. Judge Karlton was also the trial court judge in Mayweathers v. Newland, a RLUIPA prisoner case in which he rejected California correctional officials' challenge to the law's constitutionality. His decision was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit, and the U.S. Supreme Court denied cert.
On November 19, 2003, Judge Karlton issued a 47 page decision in which he found that the County has violated RLUIPA, and upheld the constitutionality of RLUIPA's land use provisions.
"There can be no doubt that plaintiff's challenge concerns 'religious exercise' within the meaning of RLUIPA," Judge Karlton wrote. "Defendants argue that plaintiff has failed to satisfy its burden because it 'does not identify a single religious belief mandated by its faith that is inhibited (much less, substantially burdened) on account of the use permit denial. . . . This argument flies in the face of both the record and common sense. Plaintiff's permit application itself details the ways in which the temple is required to facilitate Sikh religious practices. . . . Congress's decision to enact RLUIPA necessarily recognizes the fact that religious assembly buildings are needed to facilitate religious practice, and the possibility that local governments may use zoning regulations to prevent religious groups from using land for such purposes. It is for this reason that challenges of zoning ordinances are expressly contemplated by the statute. The use of the land does not have to be a 'core religious practice.'"
Did the county "substantially burden" the Guru Nanak Sikh Society's religious exercise? Judge Karlton observed that "The Supreme Court . . . has articulated the substantial burden test differently over the years," and that various federal district courts have defined in a variety of ways. He sharply disagrees with Judge Stephen Wilson's opinion in Elsinore Christian Center, which concludes that "[a]lthough RLUIPA's legislative history suggests that 'substantial burden' should be interpreted as it has been in prior case law, it is irrelevant . . . whether 'substantial' means 'non-trivial' or something greater." Judge Karlton's opinion states, "I cannot agree. Although the task is admittedly difficult, it is the obligation of the federal courts to attempt to construe the statute consistently with Congressional intent. The solution is not to interpret 'substantial burden,' as Elsinore Christian Center does, to encompass essentially any land use; rather, courts must do as Congress has instructed them to do: apply the established guideposts of 'substantial burden' analysis in a new context."
In Guru Nanak, Judge Karlton finds, "the evidence plainly indicates that the denial of the use permit, particularly when coupled with the denial of plaintiff's previous application, actually inhibits plaintiff's religious exercise." Moreover, "the County's decision to deny the permit at least raises an inference of possible discrimination," although "RLUIPA's 'substantial burden' test does not require that plaintiff actually establish discrimination . . . It is sufficient that the County's actions have had an actually inhibiting effect on plaintiff's ability to practice its religion."
Since the Guru Nanak Sikh Society has "established a prima facie case that RLUIPA has been violated, the burden now shifts to defendants to demonstrate that the County's actions were the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest. The defendants have effectively conceded this issue . . . defendants do not attempt to argue that the Supervisors' concerns with agricultural use constitute a compelling interest." Thus, "defendants denial of the use permit constitutes a violation of plaintiff's rights under RLUIPA."
Judge Karlton rejected two other RLUIPA claims, under the law's equal terms and exclusion limitation provisions.
On constitutionality, Judge Karlton noted that he had "already discussed the constitutionality of RLUIPA at length in Mayweathers," where he "rejected the argument that 'RLUIPA seeks to reverse the Supreme Court's interpretation of the First Amendment's Free Exercise Clause" in Employment Division v Smith.
In a detailed discussion of the case in which the Supreme Court declared RFRA unconstitutional, City of Boerne v. Flores, Judge Karlton quotes at length Justice Kennedy's opinion:
"While the line between measures that remedy or prevent unconstitutional actions and measures that make a substantive change in the governing law is not easy to discern, and Congress must have wide latitude in determining where it lies, the distinction exists and must be observed. There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking sch a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and effect."
"The question," Judge Karlton observed, "thus becomes whether RLUIPA embodies such 'congruence and proportionality' where RFRA did not."
"RLUIPA critically differs from RFRA. In limiting its applicability outside of the Spending and Commerce Clauses to those cases where governments make 'individual assessments,' the statute draws the very line Smith itself drew when it distinguished neutral laws of general applicability from those 'where the State has in place a system of individual exemptions,' but nevertheless 'refuse[s] to extend that system to cases of 'religious hardship,'" Judge Karlton's opinion continues.
He cited Freedom Baptist Church, where the court held that RLUIPA "is targeted solely to low visibility decisions with the obvious--and, for Congress, unacceptable--concomitant risk of idiosyncratic application."
"To the extent that RLUIPA may cover a particular case that is not on all fours with an existing Supreme Court decision, 'it nevertheless constitutes the kind of congruent, and above all, proportional remedy Congress is empowered to adopt under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.' . . . Thus, unlike RFRA, RLUIPA does not 'congradict [ ] vital principles necessary to maintain separation of powers and the federal balance.'"
Finally, he noted, "RLUIPA's legislative history establishes a pattern of constitutional violations occasioned by state land-use laws that is within Congress's power to remedy under Section 5. . . . This evidence makes clear that what the unanimous Congress that enacted RLUIPA did was not to recalibrate substantive constitutional jurisprudence. Rather, Congress acted, well within its Section 5 power, to remedy constitutional violations identified by overwhelming evidence. . . RLUIPA, both facially and as applied in this case, is a valid exercise of Congressional power."
Judge Karlton declared the May 21, 2002 decision of the Sutter County Board of Supervisors, denying the application for a conditional use permit, "in violation of RLUIPA and is accordingly ANNULLED and SET ASIDE." He ordered the "immediate approval and granting of plaintiff's application 02-01 for a conditional use permit, subject only to the appropriate conditions to which plaintiff has previously stipulated." And he granted nominal damages of one dollar from each defendant.
On December 12, 2003, Sutter County filed a notice of appeal to the Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals.
On June 9, 2004, the Becket Fund for Religious Liberty filed an amicus curiae brief with the Ninth Circuit. It asked the court to affirm Judge Karlton's decision, arguing that Sutter County's two denials of a religious use permit constitute "a direct and substantial burden on religious exercise."
The County is essentially arguing, Becket Fund said, that "the Temple must engage in a perpetual series of land purchases, applications, and denials ad infinitum until every last property has been exhausted within a jurisdiction before the burden becomes 'substantial.'"
(Guru Nanak Sikh Society of Yuba City v. County of Sutter, U.S. District Court for the Eastern District of California, case No. CIV-S-02-1785 LKK/GGH; Ninth U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, case No. 03-17343)